Ono to neni tak jednoznacne, zvlast u toho zakazkovani -etm
verze jsou z pohledu bezpecnosti naopak doporucovane a ostatnim variantam by se clovek mel spise vyhybat, protoze maji... ehm... jine a vetsi problemy.
Ostatne i samotny changelog k openssh 9.6 to komentuje celkem smysluplne....
While cryptographically novel, the security impact of this attack is fortunately very limited as it only allows deletion of consecutive messages, and deleting most messages at this stage of the protocol prevents user user authentication from proceeding and results in a stuck connection.
The most serious identified impact is that it lets a MITM to delete the SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO message sent before authentication starts, allowing the attacker to disable a subset of the keystroke timing obfuscation features introduced in OpenSSH 9.5. There is no other discernable impact to session secrecy or session integrity.